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Abstract: “Can Politics be Thought in Interiority” is an essay from L’intelligence de la politique, 
one of two book-length works published by the French anthropologist and political theorist, 
Sylvain Lazarus. The English translation of Lazarus’ first book, Anthropology of the Name, was 
published in October 2015, and while that work can rightly be considered his magnum 
opus, “Can Politics be Thought in Interiority?” provides a comprehensive, yet succinct 
statement of the concepts outlined in this much longer text. Broadly speaking, the central 
concern for Lazarus in this essay, as well as in his work as a whole, is to rehabilitate a form 
of leftist political theory that maintains the radical edge of previous discourses, without 
being vulnerable to the violent pitfalls that plagued the various socialist and communist 
projects of the 20th century, or capitulating to the dominant neoliberal or parliamentary 
regime(s). According to Lazarus, both the (failed) communist project and the current 
parliamentary-democratic project—though they espouse widely different ideologies—fall 
prey to and ultimately fail because of the same underlying structure. For Lazarus, this 
structure is what he terms “politics in exteriority,” which he defines as any mode of 
political organization that identifies politics in relation (and only in relation) to a specific 
“object” or set of objects, whether they be conceptual or empirical. The task of 
contemporary politics is not, according to Lazarus, to find new “objects” for politics to 
identify with (to use a current example, to maintain that the site of politics is not the 
nation-State but in “global citizenship” or the “global society”), but to move toward a non-
dogmatic and praxis-oriented “politics in interiority,” which this essay outlines in detail.  
It is also worth noting that Sylvain Lazarus’ work has been of crucial importance to the 
developement of the philosophical and political project of Alain Badiou, and  alongside 
Lacan, Plato, and Sartre, can be rightly considered one of the most important influences 
on Badiou’s thought. Key terms and phrases in Badiou’s project, such as “the name,” 
“politics without the party,” and “politics at a distance from the State,” as well as assertions 
such as “politics is rare,” are ideas that have been developed in concert with Lazarus 
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(during their many years of political and theoretical labour together), and in some cases, 
that have been culled directly (without alteration) from Lazarus’ body of work. As such, 
“Can Politics be Thought in Interiority?”—outside of its substantial independent merits—
will also be an invaluable resource for the ever-growing legion of Badiou scholars who, 
until recently, have had almost no direct English-language contact with Lazarus’ work, and 
as such, have not been able to get a foothold on one of Badiou’s primary influences. 
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1.  
 
I will make use of three categories: interiority, subjectivity, intellectuality. These 
categories, which have different assignments, find their consistency and their efficacy 
under the jurisdiction of the same, single principle: people think.  
 
People Think 
 
People think is my founding statement. First, we state what it is not. It is not a 
normative statement, a normative conception of people’s thought. Such a conception 
was present in the party form, where the party had the monopoly on thought. It also is 
no longer the Leninist statement that I examined in “Working Notes on Post-
Leninism,” according to which consciousness is consciousness of. I emphasized that, in 
Lenin’s work, the theory of consciousness presented the possibility of an arrival of the 
subjective as such, but that this consciousness, being consciousness of (antagonism), that is 
to say, consciousness of the State, was also a consciousness of object. Consciousness of 
antagonism as condition of the party, this major invention placed the form of 
organization (for Lenin, the party) under the thumb of a politico-statist logic which 
limits people’s capacity. By advancing the principle people think, I set aside this 
conception of political consciousness. What’s more, we are no longer within the 
problematic of the construction of a party. The conception of politics which rejects the 
one given in terms of party and State (that is to say, giving itself the State for object) 
will be called politics in interiority.  
People think is worthy of everyone. Otherwise, one returns to the Leninist 
conception of politics, divided into spontaneous consciousness (of the unorganized 
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people) and antagonistic consciousness (of the organized people), which takes us back 
to a (Marxist) dualism of the variety: ideology/science. 
People think: whether in the framework of a politics at a distance from the State (politics 
in interiority), or in the framework of a politics in the space of the State (politics in exteriority). 
In order to make it possible to have politics when people adhere to 
parliamentarianism, to syndicalism, it is necessary to admit that people who vote, who 
are syndicalized, also think. The principle people think legitimizes a politics in interiority, 
far from the State, but just as well its opposite, a politics in exteriority. In both cases, 
there is a thought and a politics. 
However, in distinguishing between a politics in interiority and a politics in 
exteriority, am I not on the path to renewing politics’ former division: the bourgeois 
version, the proletarian version? Absolutely not. In my conception of politics in 
interiority, it is a question of constructing a politics starting from a process that 
establishes politics in its own dynamic, and not simply by the work of antagonism. 
When there exists a space in interiority, it develops itself starting from itself and not 
starting from a “versus.” This development, starting from itself, is what one could call 
a “singularity.” The battles, the qualification of adversaries, are in interiority and not 
issues of a division of the real into friends and enemies.  
In interiority/in exteriority: thus, not a division between between spontaneous and 
conscious, and especially not—regarding politics in interiority—a consciousness of 
object in the old sense, in the Leninist form of consciousness of antagonism to the State 
(particularly as antagonism today finds itself in a critical phase of quasi-disappearance). 
The processes of forms of consciousness, processes of subjectivation, of the political, 
are of two orders: in exteriority and in interiority—this is a consequence of the thesis 
people think.  
 
This assumes that politics is, in a primary sense, of the order of thought and not of 
the order of “objective realities,” of the objective reality of contradictions, of which the 
State is the paradigmatic product. Thought is thus not thought of an object, it comes 
under the jurisdiction of a subjectivation, but for all that it is not without assignment 
nor precision. We will put it in this form: thought is relation of the real. “Relation of the 
real,” and not “relation to the real,” this twist of grammar serves to thoroughly 
underscore that thought does not take the real as object. The non-objectivizing 
formula “relation of the real” implies that this thought is neither graspable in the 
categories of true or false, nor in a relation of the subjective to the objective. In this 
way, people think gives an original meaning to the statement: “politics is of the order of 
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thought.” This postulate depends on a politics concerned with, what we named in 
“Notes on Post-Leninism,” the capacity of the masses.  
 
Politics in Interiority, First Assignment: People Think 
 
Politics in interiority is a politics in subjectivity.  
1. Because the State-object is not its motivation or motor. Politico-statist logic is 
insufficient for capturing or understanding the capacity of the masses. Therefore, it is 
necessary to abandon referents given in terms of object, mainly: the State. That 
politics in interiority is a politics in subjectivity is what reveals the possibility of relying on 
principles other than the expired, old Marxist referents.  
2. Because the politics that I propose rests on subjectivations, of forms of 
consciousness in interiority that it sets out from and that thrive on what people think: 
in subjectivity designates that the doing of politics develops itself based on forms of 
consciousness that I call in interiority.  
Immediately, I specify that “in subjectivity” is to be distinguished from what I 
understand by “process of subjectivation” or “subjectivations.” In effect, in politics in 
exteriority (in the space of the State), there are also subjectivations, forms of 
consciousness, but they are in exteriority. Calling politics in interiority a politics in 
subjectivity indicates that the subjectivations are, in this case, in interiority: 
concentrated in a “what one can do oneself,” and not simply in an “against which one 
struggles.” That politics in interiority is also in subjectivity indicates the subjectivation’s 
singular nature. 
3. Because it is also a politics which thinks itself, without the aid of other doctrines: 
philosophy, history, economics, sociology, etc. The thesis here is that the subjective 
can not lead to anything but the subjective—the subjective thinks itself according to 
the subjective. Thus, it is a question of a theory of the singularity of politics. The 
abandonment of supports or referents exterior to politics, or borrowings from other 
disciplines, defines the statement politics is a thought. Thinking itself, it is a thought. The 
element of the subjective is an essential part of the machinery—one could call a 
politics in interiority a politics in subjectivity.  
The subjective dimension of politics in interiority is, negatively: 
• what rejects the object-subject relation and previous forms of politics with 
regard to objects;  
• what acknowledges the end of the previous referents: of Marxism-Leninism 
(the Stalinist theoretical formation, repudiated as such), the notion of party 
and the way in which classism is obsolete (it is no longer operant).  
 And positively:  
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• what thrives on the principle people think; 
• what makes it possible to identify the politics that I propose. Politics is in 
subjectivity when the subjective is in interiority. 
 
We take an example of what we refer to as people’s thought: regarding the word 
“worker”—it is in a process in interiority.  
The word “worker” was dismissed by a member of Mitterand’s first government, 
during a strike at Talbot-Poissy in January 1984, when striking foreign workers were 
attacked with bolts thrown by supervisors, and by the cry “Arabs to the oven”—a 
noteworthy coalescence of anti-semitism and xenophobia. The member of the 
government who condemned this strike did so by declaring that it was the work of 
individual immigrants “unfamiliar with the realities of France,” and in this way, 
substituted the word “worker” with “immigrant,” opening the period in which the 
word “worker” disappeared from the official public sphere. 
It was discovered again at Renault-Billancourt (now standing on Seguin Island) 
during a long survey of the OS (ouvriers spécialisés, “semi-skilled workers”) of the 
mountain chains. Here, every person was of foreign origin, and the term “worker” was 
not used as a sociological characteristic, but came in the form of a problematic word 
designating the function of a person in the factory, given in the statement: “I am a 
worker. In the factory one calls me a worker, but outside of the factory, one calls me 
an immigrant because they forgot that I was a worker.” Deciding as to the existence of 
the word—thus forbidding its disappearance, subjectivating it as what permits a 
transformation in consciousness of those who pronounce it—is exactly what I mean by 
people think. I draw your attention to the formulation: “outside of the factory, one calls 
me an immigrant because they have forgotten that I am a worker.” “Immigrant” 
specifies itself through the forgetting of “worker.” It follows that it is in the factory that 
the word “worker” functions, which results in two statements for our politics: in the 
factory, there is a worker; and: make the factory into a political place. And later: the factory is the 
place of the worker.  
As for forms of consciousness in subjectivity, the OS, with whom we had long been 
in discussion, did not refer to itself as the working class—and not by ignorance, let me 
tell you—but quite simply because in subjectivity the working class was no longer 
operant. It was the factory that was operant: as the place of the worker. The rest of 
Billancourt’s OS easily confirmed this judgement; they judged the situation thus: that 
the crossing out of the word “worker” opened, among other things, to “widespread 
LePenism” and to the devaluation of manual labor, the consequences of which we are 
aware of, especially as regards education. 
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With this example concerning the word “worker,” we see that an aspect of the 
work of the masses consists in investigating and opening up the question of names. This 
will make the formulation of prescriptions possible, prescription being defined as: the 
form that a decision takes and that political will opens to a possible. The prescription 
can be assembled in a statement—in our example: in the factory, there are workers, and 
make the factory into a political place. 
 
 
 
 
Politics in Interiority, Final Assignment: Politics’ Historical Mode 
 
Politics in interiority, in its assignment to the principle people think, produces a 
politics in subjectivity. In its assignment to historicity, it is what makes it possible to 
grasp the way in which politics exists, when it does exist, as relation of a politics to its 
thought: this is the theory of politics’ historical mode. The category of politics’ historical 
mode is what makes it possible to apprehend a politics in the singular invention that it 
presents, the equally singular practices that it deploys, its hitherto unseen forms of 
organization.  
  
Historical Mode of Politics in Interiority 
 
Politics in interiority does not appear and does not exist except in the form of a 
mode. 
A mode in interiority can be identified (we can know its nature) by looking for 
what thought has been opened up in the world. This inventive thought is that of the 
mode’s actors, and can, at certain times, be given by a proper name (Saint-Just, Lenin, 
Mao, for example). It creates the categories, the notions, the concepts specific to the 
mode. These categories are singular: the space of their existence, of their efficacy and 
their functioning is the space and the time of such a mode—because there is, we will 
see, a space and a time of a mode in interiority. What’s more, the mode’s categories 
are not utilizable anywhere except in the mode which they created; they are not 
generalizable. United with the mode—in other words, the categories’ own invention—
they are said to be worn out or saturated in their usage and their existence when the 
mode ceases. 
 
Politics in interiority is sequential and rare: In effect, the theory of politics’ modal 
existence is also that of its sequentiality. Politics is sequential: it does not exist all the 
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time; a singular politics has a beginning and an end. What’s more, the sequences do 
not link up or accumulate. We say, therefore, that politics is rare. 
 
The places of the world: How to identify and understand the cessation of a mode in 
interiority? By a second property of a historical mode of politics. What attests to the 
reality of a mode is, certainly, its thought, but it it is also its adequacy to the creation of 
places of politics. As such, the mode is not only a thought of the sequence—militants, or 
actors of the mode, create places (I will illustrate this point more fully later). For what I 
refer to as the “revolutionary mode,” the places are the Convention and the sociétés 
sans-culotte; for the “Bolshevik mode,” the Soviets and the party. In the “dialectical 
mode,” it is new processes, such as the invention of the “people’s war” and the 
revolutionary army in Maoism. “The army charged with the political tasks of the 
revolution,” “the army in the service of the people”—these are the places of the mode 
that I term “dialectical,” and whose proper name is Mao Tse-tung. 
Thus, there are a multiplicity of places. When one of the places comes to disappear, 
the mode disappears. Its categories are worn out, and as such one cannot reuse them 
elsewhere in order to qualify a political invention in a different sequence. This is the 
thesis of politic’s singularity. Each political sequence in interiority is a singular 
phenomenon. As such, there is no universality of politics. Only a singularity’s thought 
can realize it. 
 
A historical mode of politics in interiority is thus identifiable, able to be sorted out, 
by its places and the categories created and systematized by actors internal to the 
mode. It is what signifies and brings about that we can identify a mode of politics by its 
thought, or more precisely, by the relation of a politics to its thought. The formulation 
“relation to its thought” indicates that a politics thinks itself as politics, and thus states 
what founds itself as political.  
We will say that there is a historical mode of politics when one can reflect upon it 
according to the relation to its thought. Insofar as there exists no politics in interiority but 
modal—politics does not exist except in a sequential fashion—we can propose that a 
politics in interiority is a thought. 
 
Modes of Politics in Interiority and in Exteriority 
 
What I propose is the theory of politics’ modes. People think is the appraisal I make 
of Leninism when, by contrast to politico-statist logic, it opens up the investigation of 
what people “can do.” It is also the attempt to establish, outside of all idealism, that in 
the phrase: “the historical mode of politics is the relation of a politics to its thought,” 
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the thought is a political statement. That politics is a thought is a theory that is obvious after 
extensive, organized work with the people.  
I distinguish two “types” of modes: 
• The mode in interiority, where people’s thought organizes action, creates new 
categories and invents multiple places. In the mode in interiority, to say that 
people’s thought is in subjectivity indicates that it bears on the people 
themselves, those who will, those who do, and not on structures that one could 
call objective (classes, State forms, the nature of the economy). We hope to 
make this clear in the examples of modes that will follow. 
• The mode in exteriority, in short, is the one where the State reigns. Yet, it will not 
be apprehended by the analytical description of forms of oppression and 
domination, of the wealthy and the women and men of power (even though 
this analysis always has to be done, as we will see), but by the way in which 
people treat this situation. In other words, it is a question of understanding 
what people think in a mode in exteriority, what the forms of subjectivation of 
people in this (malicious) situation are. Exteriority means taking into 
consideration (in a current mode) or studying (in a closed mode) the modalities 
of people’s subjectivation. The mode in exteriority will be understood from the 
question of what people do and think in this mode. Keeping it well in mind 
that in a mode in exteriority people think in the space of the State. The mode 
in exteriority is thus in compliance with the theory of the mode as relation of a 
politics to its thought. However, it is this that distinguishes exteriority and 
interiority: in a mode in exteriority the point of subjectivation is the State or 
the party-State, which organizes people’s thought. It is the state that is the 
referent of the processes of subjectivation. It is in exteriority.  
Thus: in the mode in interiority, the point of politics’ subjectivation is the thought 
of the actors themselves; the process of subjectivation is itself in interiority—in the 
mode in exteriority, the process of subjectivation is in exteriority: it is the party or the 
State. As for places, on the other hand, the mode in exteriority does not present itself 
in a multiplicity of places (as with the mode in interiority), but by the preeminence of a 
single place, the party or the State. The party or State gives itself as the unique place 
of the modal sequence in exteriority. 
 
2. 
 
Beginning from the moment when the failure of revolutions and the development 
of communist parties into party-States repudiates the Leninist program, and from the 
moment when we finish with classism—that is to say, when the class struggle is no 
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longer subjectively and politically operant—it is necessary to liberate politics from the 
problematic of antagonism, and to no longer the give the State-object as 
consubstantial. We reiterate, it necessitates a new approach to politics, and demands, 
from the very beginning, no longer centering or focusing politics on the State, and beyond 
that, on the statist form of power. A new politics will be at a distance from the State. 
The failure of socialism is not simply the failure of its program—the disappearance 
of classes and the wasting away of the State—it is the failure of a general centering of 
politics on the State. The objectival vision of politics is also, today and in France, that 
there is no politics except that of the State apparatus and from the interior of its logics 
such as they formulate themselves: i.e., to do politics is to enter into 
parliamentarianism.  
The project of politics in interiority is ultimately the research into a new 
positioning of the question of the State. Namely, how to face the State when one is 
neither within the hypothesis of a parliamentary opposition nor that of the 
revolutionary destruction of the State in place? However, no politics in interiority is 
tenable if it does not place itself in a new position regarding what people’s capacity is, 
and what I call the possible. The possible and people’s capacity are the two cornerstones 
of what I call politics in interiority.  
Restructuring the category of the possible based on people’s capacity, a capacity 
which is up to date with historical experience (the collapse of socialism), means not 
beginning with the question of the State. How can people’s political capacity come up 
with formulations adequate to the principle people think—this is the work of politics in 
interiority; that people’s forms of consciousness are different than politico-statist logic 
is its point of departure. If the forms of people’s consciousness focus on the use of their 
capacity, it is right to say that the subjective (of forms of consciousness) is understood 
based on the subjective (people’s capacity).  
Nonetheless, practicing politics at a distance from the State in no way means 
ignoring the central character of the state, but instead, holding the essential question to 
be: what are people’s forms of subjectivity today? It is progress on this point that will 
reorganize, in different terms, the prescriptions of a new politics for dealing with the 
State. 
 
“Politics is of the order of thought,” “the subjective is understood based on the 
subjective,” and “politics in interiority”—these three formulations integrate a new 
attempt to consider politics after the end of classism and in a space other than that of 
the State. And, first and foremost, this is to declare that politics does not give itself in 
the space of an object, whether that be the State or the revolution.  
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A political process in interiority has as its primary thesis that politics is a thought: it 
depends on people’s forms of consciousness and, in that, comes under the jurisdiction 
of their subjective power. People’s subjective power is a thought and not simply the 
reflection of their material or social situation. But this is not the entirety of the 
question. It is also a question of a thesis regarding the nature of the irreducibility of 
this process to all other spaces except that of politics, and regarding the necessity of 
reflecting upon it in its singularity. 
Politics is posed here as having its own field of thought which cannot be, without it 
disappearing, subordinated to an exterior field, whether that be philosophic, 
economic, or historical. Thus, it is a matter of thinking politics based on itself and not 
starting from other disciplines: politics has its own intellectuality. Consequently it is 
necessary, in order to subscribe to this demand (thinking politics through itself), to 
think it in subjectivity in a manner that never makes it into an object. Thinking it as 
thought, and not as object, is what I call proceeding by a process in subjectivity. 
We claim the following: There is no politics in general. Politics corresponds neither 
to invariants nor to the structures of societies. There is no politics except in exteriority 
or in interiority. The latter is exceptional. To say that there is a thought authorizes not 
needing the State, power or history in order to identify it. Claiming it to be in 
subjectivity is to identify it outside of social assemblages, classes, social conflicts, the 
question of power, and thus outside of everything that we are accustomed to 
designating as political or “fully political.” Politics is never everywhere; it is not the 
management of the State, of the affairs of the State. The State is distinct from politics, 
and included therein are the transformations that we have been speaking of. The State 
gives itself as permanent and as an invariant of modern societies. Maintaining that 
politics is of the order of thought establishes politics as singularity. That politics comes 
under the jurisdiction of singularity, it is this that will satisfy the notion of politics’ 
historical mode. 
Why say that politics is a thought and not be content with the category of 
consciousness as envisioned by Lenin? I repeat: Lenin invented consciousness in 
politics. That consciousness is a consciousness of antagonism. That is to say, of an 
antagonism of subjectivity. This means that the party seizes it, that the objective 
contradiction becomes consciousness. We can measure the difference from Marx, 
according to whom the material conditions of existence determine forms of 
consciousness. Consciousness exists already according to Marx, but it is an effect, it is 
determined by the material conditions of existence. According to Lenin, there is no 
determination, there is a condition. And for the first time, a subjective dimension 
appears.  
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In that case, was it possible to imagine, beginning with Lenin, a consciousness 
without of, to give the subjective a vaster and much more indistinct domain than the 
simple consciousness of (antagonism), consciousness guaranteed according to the point 
of view of class? Can politics come entirely under the jurisdiction of consciousness and can 
it employ the category of consciousness without object, without specification?  
 
A de-objectification of the category of consciousness seems possible to me. I no 
longer think it. Consciousness is no longer the central category of politics. To the 
extent that I continue to judge that politics is of the order of the subjective, we will 
come to see that I propose understanding it otherwise: by politics’ historical mode, that 
is to say, by a relation to its thought. Only the confusion between politics and history, 
politics and State, authorizes believing in the permanence of politics. There are, 
therefore, no politics that are not singular.  
 
Each mode is a singularity. In this way, the following theses: “politics is of the order of 
thought” and “politics is thinkable” are equivalent, not in general aims, but in a 
problematic of singularity whose ultimate point is the characterization of politics as 
mode.  
The existence of a political sequence—that is to say, of a historical mode of 
politics—shows itself in multiple ways: 
• By the creation of places, as we mentioned. These places are not “physical” 
places. A place is not a statement of localization, but of delocalization; politics 
no longer identifies itself by parties, classes and States, but in modes in 
interiority, by forms of presence to themselves: assemblages, processes, other 
forms of organization. The mode ceases when one of its places comes to 
disappear. All politics in subjectivity has some places, which are its spaces of 
crystallization, where it deploys itself and exercises itself. The end of the 
sequence is its cessation and not its defeat. 
• The mode in interiority incarnates the lacunary existence of politics insofar as 
each mode characterizes itself by a singular category, and not by means of a 
permanent structure. One sees clearly that the sequential and the non-
objectival go hand in hand. The work of the mode’s identification takes place 
by the identification of the politics’ thought and by the dating of its sequence. 
One could say that a historical mode of politics is in interiority, on the one hand, 
when in an historical period one can isolate a sequence when a politics’ 
thought exists and when the relation of this thought to the sequence is shown, 
and on the other hand, when there are a multiplicity of places. 
As for political thought in exteriority, its principal assignments are:  
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• The state and power, presented as the system founding modern politics and as 
the real of politics. State and power are regarded as the concepts through 
which the political real must be apprehended. 
• Classes, either as system, or as political subjects in their contradictions or in 
their antagonism. 
We could say that a mode is in exteriority when politics is assigned to a single 
place, generally the State (for example, parliamentarianism) or the party (Stalin’s 
party-State) and when all thought is under the rules of the State or the party, and 
when political work shows itself in the form of oppressive singularities. Subjectivation, 
in that case, is in exteriority. There are two forms of subjectivation. In exteriority: it 
reveals itself as cohesion, adhesion. In interiority: it reveals itself as opening up a 
possible. We turn to the former.  
The principle people think is not a an angelism. People think can apply itself to 
criminal politics, Nazism for example, which is a mode of politics—the kind of politics 
I will not deal with here. In the Nazi case, people adhere to the program’s thought, 
sharing it, living and dying for it. The rallying falls under the jurisdiction neither of 
madness, nor of fascination, nor the absoluteness of coercion. Thus, one can say that 
this rallying “in thought,” in subjectivation, is likewise singular. Such a mode’s relation 
of the real is what in it organizes domination: terror and concentration camps, 
permanent war and extermination.  
In the USSR, it is undeniable that one knew, in forms singular and distinct, a 
rallying behind the Stalinist state. It is this that has permitted the most reactionary 
theoreticians, at a far remove from any thought of what singularity this is, to place 
Nazism and Stalinism in parallel and to attempt to validate the equation 
Hitler=Stalin. In both modes, certainly, the point of subjectivation is in exteriority: 
adhesion to Hitlerian criminal politics or to the Stalinist terrorist State. And in each 
case, subjectivation does not bear directly on people’s capacity, but mediately through 
the intermediary of the Nazi State or of the Stalinist State, to which this capacity is 
identified. In Nazism: racialism, identification of politics with total war; and in 
Stalinism, without relation or measure: socialism in one country and the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. In a mode in exteriority, criminal or not, it is the States that are the 
operators of the political track. It is because the point of subjectivation exists in 
exteriority in the different cases—including contemporary parliamentarianism in 
France (a state that is fortunately not massively criminal)—that we can examine them 
in such a mode, and consequently, as relation to a thought. 
However, there is one other motive that drives me to test the principle people think 
in a mode in exteriority. It is clearly the question: is there a relation of people to the 
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state other than that of adhesion, in a space where the state is referential? What then 
of people’s capacity, if they pose this question to themselves. What then of the 
possibility of a liberating politics (to reclaim this term from the era of the 1917 
revolution) in a mode in exteriority? 
Based on the crises and expirations of classism, the category of antagonism (to the 
State), and finally, of revolution (seldom on our horizon in these days of 1985) one 
could have easily concluded, and many did, that the people, the masses, the classes, 
having on the whole renounced revolution and antagonism, signaled either their 
consent to domination, or at best, their impotence. It is essential to argue for a position 
other than that of adhesion and impotence. It is essential to insist on the subjective, 
including the relation of classes to parliamentarianism, otherwise the presumption of a 
rupture is impossible. The only argument in favor of the possibility of a rupture with 
the order of things is that the subjective exists, even if it is as adhesion to the order of 
things. If people think, then another subjectivation is possible.  
 
We recap briefly. Politics in intellectuality (of which I have not yet spoken, but will 
say a few words here), in subjectivity, and in interiority are formulations that do not 
exclude one another, but that distinguish their assignment or their destination: 
• intellectuality has for its assignment militant practice, it is conceptual 
elaboration; 
• subjectivity has for its assignment the principle people think; 
• interiority has for its assignment the existence of politics, knowing the mode’s 
theory and testing the thesis politics is a thought . Therefore, it is a question of 
formulating a political thought of politics, and of putting politics, including 
what we do, to the test of its own thought. 
To resume, I will say henceforth: my enterprise is that of a political thought of 
politics; putting politics to the test of its own thought; making a relation of politics to its 
thought a framework for testing and analyzing politics, and submitting politics (that we 
create) to the test of its thought in interiority.  
 
3.  
  
A Few Historical Modes in Interiority: 
 
The Classist Mode 
 
With the Communist Manifesto, published in 1848, what I term the “classist mode” of 
politics announces itself. We repeat yet again: to identify a mode is to identify its 
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political categories—in other words, its politics’ thought, but also the dates of its 
appearance and saturation.  
First, it is necessary to note that in the 19th century the category of class is 
dominant. The political theses specific to Marx do not reside in the usage of the 
category of class (which was not invented by him, as he emphasizes, but by historians) 
nor even in the invention and usage of the categories which are attached to him: the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and communism. The key point is the following: the 
Manifesto proclaims a politics where history is the category of politics. In its usage by 
the classist mode, the laws of history, of which posterity will make ample use of, do not 
yield to the present in its relation to the future.  
This thesis must be grasped in its force, or in its apparent paradox: history, the one 
which Marx called “history of class struggle,” is not only objective or descriptive—to 
which the thoroughly posterior and largely Stalinist idea of “historical materialism” or 
history as science attaches itself. For Marx, history is above all a category of politics, 
that is to say, what I call a prescriptive category (I remind you that the prescriptive is 
what opens a specific possible).  
How is this thesis to be justified?  
First of all, it is necessary to see that history, in the class-dictatorship schema of 
proletariat-communism, is not simply, nor even primarily, history of the past, but 
history of the future. This is what Marx’s adversaries refer to as his “prophecy.” What 
Marx announces is that history bears on the present and on the future. Beginning with 
what exists, it reveals what a rupture with what exists could be. As such, it tips over 
into the prescriptive, giving the name of history a political character.  
It is without doubt that Marx knows how to be a historian, with talent and 
profundity, when it is a matter of the past and the present. But the category of history 
becomes prescriptive when it is a question of the future. Conjoined to the category of 
classes, dictatorship of the proletariat and communism, history becomes a project of 
rupture with the existing order.  
In the Manifesto—so that an identical categorical register can thus cover the past, 
the present and the future—it is necessary that history functions as a form of political 
consciousness in order for this relation of thought to time to be possible. It is this 
historical consciousness, covering the past, present, and future, that characterizes the 
interiority of the classist mode. 
The essential consequence of this conception of history is that, in politics’ classist 
mode, there is no “class party.” Those who Marx calls “communists” are nothing but 
a fraction of the working-class parties and, more exactly, of the revolutionary 
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movement. What supports the unity of history and politics is not at all the party, but 
the movement. 
Regarding this crucial point, we cite a few passages: 
“…the Communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against 
the existing social and political order of things. 
In all these movements they bring to the front, as the leading question in each, the 
property question…(chapter IV).” 
During the movement, the function of the communists is regulated by the 
prescription of historical consciousness; they are the ones who bring history to bear on 
the future: 
“The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate aims, for the 
enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the movement of 
the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that movement.” 
History and politics in the unity of the present and the future are what the 
communists, who are the militants of the classist mode of politics, guarantee the unity 
of in consciousness.   
In this way, history is that by which a politics, in and by movement, relates its 
thought to itself. History is the central category of thought in politics’ classist mode.  
Yet, the category of the revolutionary movement is essential as history’s figure of 
the present. It is, in the interior of the classist mode, what permits the linking-up of the 
terms, first pair by pair, then taken all together: present/future, history/politics, 
immediate interests/communism.  
Today, despite the crisis of the mode’s categorical referents—class, dictatorship of 
the proletariat or communism—the notion of “movement” parades the same pairs 
around, making it into a circulating category (an epithet that I oppose to “singular”) 
which allows a facile optimism to unify different processes. This demonstrates that 
categories have no true political force except in their connection to a mode (here, the 
classist mode), and can, when disconnected, continue to exist as obscure and 
disappointing representations. 
 
The situation in 1871, after the Paris Commune, closed the classist mode which 
had begun in 1848 with the publication of the Manifesto. This closure, registered by 
Marx, stemmed from what is so evident: namely, that the revolutionary movement, in 
its most frequently deployed form, is not the place where the communist political 
prescription succeeds in affirming itself. With the Commune, the categories of the 
revolutionary movement and the communist portion of that movement (which are the 
mode’s places) are saturated.  
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I would add that it is after the Commune that parties in the modern sense of the 
word appeared, connected to the parliamentary State and completely different from 
what Marx meant by the communist portion of revolutionary movements. While 
aligning themselves with a class problematic, or even a kind of class, these parties—
whose model is German social democracy—are in reality statist organizations, internal 
to the State and the subjectivations that are connected to it. The rallying of the SPD in 
Germany and the SFIO in France to the Union sacrée in 1914 fully exposes their 
homogeneity with the State, and liquidates the class nature of these parties. 
At the interior of this latter sequence, the appearance of the Bolshevik political 
mode between 1902 and 1917—the mode to which the name Lenin is attached—will 
give yet another meaning to the category of party: the statement “classes are 
represented by parties” will no longer be an historical, expressive, or descriptive 
statement, but a prescriptive statement. For Lenin, politics is conditional, and the 
party is nothing but the indicator of the condition’s existence. 
 
In the end, the overwhelming concern of the Manifesto is three-fold: 
• It brings about a mode of politics, a mode in interiority, the classist mode, 
which organizes in consciousness a fusion of history and politics.  
• It identifies the sequential nature of the theme of the “revolutionary 
movement,” which has no authentic political meaning except at the interior of 
the classist mode and whose political power disappears with the Paris 
Commune.  
• We note that no mode of politics in interiority ever validates the theme “class 
party.” Regarding modes, we have, according to Marx: the fusion of politics 
and history, and, according to Lenin: conditional politics. According to Mao 
Tse-tung, it will be the modification of antagonism by the dialectic of 
development. For him, the theme of the class party remains attached to modes 
of politics in exteriority, and particularly to the Stalinist mode of politics. This 
point is of the greatest concern for those who, like us, are seeking to prescribe a 
politics without party.  
 
The Bolshevik Mode 
 
I will be brief here, having already brought up Lenin quite a bit. The sequence of 
the Bolshevik mode began in February 1902 with the publication of What is to be Done? 
and terminated in October 1917. On the other side of this date, we see the statisation 
of the party. The party and the Soviets, which are the places of the mode, disappear 
and become State apparatuses. 
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This mode is not characterized by consciousness of antagonism, as one might 
expect given the importance that I attributed to it in “Notes on Post-Leninism,” but as 
the conditional mode of politics. Therein resides Lenin’s thought and its singularity.  
(Proletarian) political capacity is neither innate, nor spontaneous, nor structural, 
but in its obligation to state its own conditions of existence. This condition convokes 
the party, but the party is not the expression of a class, it is itself conditional: it does 
not forge itself except as proportionate to consciousness of antagonism—a condition 
which is also that of the revolutionary perspective. 
Consequently, this conception is contrasted with the spontaneous or expressive 
vision of the political and of the social. The proletarian revolution, the antagonism 
with the existing social and political order, certainly frames the Leninist thought of 
politics but does not establish it in its singularity. This singularity resides in what I call 
politics’ conditional mode.  
The party is under the condition of consciousness of antagonism, which is 
subjective. But this is in no way a guarantee as it is according to Stalin. The condition 
of the party, in other words, what formulates the party, is the condition of its adequacy 
to situations. Here, we are very far from the way in which the parties of socialist 
countries have functioned in their becoming State-parties.  
 
The Dialectical Mode 
 
The dialectical mode—and here “dialectical” is, as we will see, paradoxical—is the 
mode of revolutionary war whose proper name is Mao Tse-Tung. It makes itself heard 
from 1928 to 1950, which is to say from the publication of “Why is it that Red Political 
Power can Exist in China” to the beginning of the Korean War, when the modalities 
of the revolutionary war came to an end.  
In this mode, the relation of politics to its thought occurs in the category of 
principles, which help to understand contexts and situations.  
According to Mao, there exists a process regarding knowledge whose central 
category is “principle.” There exist a multiplicity of principles, all designed to treat 
situations. As an example, let’s take one of the texts on war: “The Chinese Revolution 
and the Chinese Communist Party” (chap. II, of Problems of Strategy in China’s 
Revolutionary War, 1936). Exposed there are the principles of war, of the revolutionary 
war—whose system is the “Long March,” the principles of encircling villages by 
campaigns—and the principle of the revolution in China. Immediately, the principles 
are considered in relation to their time, their context. We do not have a dogmatic 
sense of principle: principles change, and they change because the situation changes. It 
is not the principles of history that act, but those that permit treating situations: 
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complex situations, dramatic circumstances. Here, the dialectical mode is de-
historicizing. And de-historicizing, in that, by subordinating history to the masses, this 
strictly Maoist category, it makes history disappear in favor of what Mao called 
“enthusiasm for socialism.” Enthusiasm for socialism is not (only) that of a “radiant 
future,” but a singular theory of development (here, a term that is in no way 
economic), registered from now on in the forms taken by the army: not only military 
force, but practicing the work of the masses, which is obligatory. The situation is 
“complex.” It is the general situation and the situation of the parties. “Work of the 
masses” and “situation” form a couple according to Mao. It is starting from this couple 
that principles are formulated. “The situation is variable,” requires diverse principles 
which make treating it possible.  
But the most general principle which interests us, having to do with development, 
is the following: “the new is created in the struggle against the old.”  
  
Thought is largely assigned to the elaboration and formulation of principles. It 
possess a great mobility: this is its continual appearance, and gives the utmost attention 
to what changes, to the “new,” the sign of a non dogmatic touch. The rule of 
elaboration and the process of a principle’s formulation, focusing on the new in its 
opposition to the old, organizes a relation of the subjective to the objective, which is to 
say a relation of thought to what Mao calls “objective reality.” It is thus a dialectic. 
The dialectic brought about by the accumulation of sensible knowledge, and by 
leaping toward the concept, is named “investigation.” The goal is identifying politics as 
knowledge.  
We are thus in a process of knowledge. Political knowledge is specific, Mao will 
declare, to those who rally to dialectical materialism—that is to say, to Marxism, 
which is to say, to the proletariat. Dialectical materialism differs from all others: 1) 
because it serves the proletariat, 2) because it is based on practice. 
It has a class assignment: Mao essentially says that our tactics and our strategy 
cannot be utilized by anyone but us—“no army opposed to the people can utilize our 
strategy and our tactics.” Tactics or principles of the party (of battle, of engagement), 
strategy or the principle of the whole, these principles do not “circulate.” These are the 
principles of politics. Here, politics has principles. 
I term dialectical mode this relation of a politics to its thought.  
Why appoint “dialectic” to this mode and not have it identified by Marx or by 
what I call the Bolshevik mode? Marx announces a dialectic, but appointed to the 
question of materialism and to the inversion of Hegel, though I diverge with him on 
this point. In Lenin, there is a dialectic of bourgeois/proletarian contradictions and an 
arrival of a non-dialectizable subjective (consciousness of). Added to this is the 
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existence, according to Lenin, of a gap between history and politics, a gap that the 
party is committed to diminishing by seizing power, and thus changing history.  
Yet, for Mao, the thought is not that of a balance, whatever that may be, between 
politics and history. History is absented in favor of the law. No hope of fusion between 
politics and history ever shows itself. And at the same time, there exists a political 
optimism, not the historical optimism of “the day after” which lifts one’s spirits, but a 
political optimism whose category is the masses, the “popular masses.” A new 
category. Not to be understood in the blissful sense in which this term was taken, but 
as a process where the category of the masses subordinates itself to history.  
The masses are grasped in the process of practice and statements. It is in this cycle 
that the principles of thought and of practice are formulable. The masses, for Mao, do 
not make history, they are history. To such an extent that they are more than history. 
The history that persists nonetheless is the history of systems: we find historical theses 
on imperialism (Mao claims that it binds all), or on the USSR. However, history in 
Marx’s sense, in its active function as “maker,” has disappeared. Hence this new 
optimism, which calls itself “confidence in the masses.” Confidence because—“the 
masses have…a vast reservoir of enthusiasm for socialism.” Not for history. The 
dialectical mode de-historicizes.  
The dialectical mode is the one in which the category of the masses is essential. 
But what is the process of the dialectic? This dialectic is not between the parties and 
the masses. An yet, “it is necessary to have confidence in the masses,” and “it is 
necessary to have confidence in the party.” Nothing can take place without the party, 
even if there are cases of rebellion against the party, as during the Peng Dehuai affair. 
Certainly, the party is important, but it neither identifies the mode nor the dialectic. 
The dialectic is that of knowledge, of thought and of objective reality. And it is a dialectic which 
places in relation and in conflict two subjectives: “thought,” to be sure, but also 
“situation.” The situation is not only objective reality, it is objective reality in situation.  
As such, the dialectic must proceed through situations on a grand scale: war, the 
wars, from which one can formulate principles which are the categories of politics in 
war, or rather of politics in the situation of war. It is in this way that “The red army is 
an armed organization charged with the political tasks of the revolution” must be 
understand as one of the central theses of the party. The army practices the work of 
the masses, it nourishes enthusiasm for socialism. 
No situation can give up on the the principle of the masses. The dialectical mode is 
what bases itself on human capacity if political capacity is mobilized. In order to 
mobilize this political capacity, the necessary apparatus is the masses, the people, the 
party, the classes. Why? Because here we are at the heart of the theory: the theory of 
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development. The latter authorizes a transformation of the category of antagonism; it is 
not conceived as a frontal attack, the brutal fall of the State in place, nor as 
insurgencies conducted against it, but as transformation and as the partial passage to 
socialism: “liberated areas.” Thus, in the place of the theory of the class’ antagonism to 
the State, or of a thought given in terms of historical stages (urban insurrection, 
revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat), the development is, by way of people’s war, 
that of socialism.  
 
The masses subordinate themselves to history, we are in the realm of neither Marx 
nor Lenin. Antagonism takes on another meaning: it is transformation and localized 
construction of socialism in the form of liberated areas. In the dialectical mode, the 
struggle between bourgeois and proletariat (without forgetting the struggle against 
feudalism) gives itself under the species of movement. Movement (development of 
socialism) becomes one of the categories of the mode’s thought and of politics’ 
thought. The dialectic is grasped as the axis of the passage from feudalism and the 
bourgeois to socialism. The passage to socialism is effectuated neither by insurrection 
based on the 1917 model, nor by a toppling over of the bourgeois State in the 
proletarian State, but by the growing movement that the liberated areas have 
embodied. The principal notion becomes that of development and un-development, of 
“what develops and what un-develops.” The dialectical mode is thus that of the 
dialectic between developing and un-developing. Movement, transformation, development are 
the categories of the mode’s thought. The category of the masses can be understood as 
the point of the mode’s subjectivation. 
 The non-central place given to antagonism is therefore essential for identifying 
this mode in interiority. There exists a positivity in the dialectical mode, which focuses 
on the new meaning of antagonism: it can not do everything, it needs the concept of 
the masses in order to rework it. Antagonism is not transformation unless the practice 
of the masses is different than traditional antagonism and frontal assault. Here, we 
have the practice of socialism in the liberated areas, and in the relation of the army to 
the villagers and to the people in general; and the personified antagonism of war. 
Materialism subsumed by the dialectic of development proper to the mode avoids 
all objectivism. The reality is that there exists non-antagonistic contradictions that 
Mao called “contradictions at the heart of the people.” 
Dialectical also because it rests on a new theory of contradiction; the mode has at 
its center a dialectical materialism of transformation distinct from the Stalinist theory 
of contradiction. The position of the mode’s real is in subjectivity: it is the function 
given to the category of the masses. 
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It is thus people’s war, regarded as a factor of development and transformation, that 
identifies the mode and which is the privileged place of the dialectic. It is a dialectic of 
development, in the framework of a Marxist theory of contradictions, which Mao 
reworked from end to end. The places of the mode are those of the revolutionary war: 
the army, the party, the united front. The temporal limits of the mode go, as we 
mentioned, from 1928 (the year of “Why is it that Red Power can Exist in China?”) to 
1950 (beginning with the Korean war, when the modalities of the revolutionary war 
ceased). I would like to conclude with a saying Mao often repeated: “the question of 
which wins out, socialism or capitalism, is still not really solved.” And he adds that a 
hundred years will not be enough. 
 
 
 
A Mode in Exteriority: The Parliamentary Mode 
 
I call “parliamentarianism” the historical mode of contemporary politics dominant 
in France since 1974. By this term I do not mean to indicate the multipartyism that 
claims to be democratic. Parties are statist formations dedicated to the alternation of 
power and are not representative (of classes and their specific interests).  
Incidentally, a historical mode of politics, even thought it has the State as its center 
and its place, is something completely different than a form of the State. The juridical and 
constitutional dimension, the separation of powers, the acknowledgement of freedom 
of opinion, association, etc. are the structural characteristics of the State. It does not 
identify the parliamentary mode.  
Henceforth, I will call “parliamentarianism,” not the form of the State, but the 
forms of consciousness subject to a singular configuration that one can isolate based on 
its statements and its declarations. Parliamentarianism is consensual and functional.  
 
The Consensual State 
 
Parliamentarianism is a mode in exteriority. That means that it denies that politics 
is a thought. Its conception of politics is that it is not a thought, but rather, that politics 
is constitutive of an opinion about the government. Parliamentary political parties are 
the organizers, in consciousness, of such opinions. From this point of view, parties do 
nothing but organize the subjective dimension of the State. It follows that 
parliamentary parties are not political organizations, but statist organizations. 
Parliamentarianism, as politics in exteriority, allows itself to be described as a function 
of the party-State (plural). 
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Parliamentary political subjectivation does not fall under the jurisdiction of the 
principle people think, but under the principle people have opinions. The vote, which is the 
point of institutional articulation between the subjective of opinion and governmental 
objectivity, is the only essential political act of Parliamentarianism. In this sense, voting 
is always, regardless of the intentions of the voting, a subjective rallying essential to the 
parliamentary mode. This is why all real political ruptures with this mode prescribe, 
not exactly abstention, but the non-vote.  
The vote in no way serves to “represent” opinions. The articulation between the 
subjectivation of opinion and the government is not representative. The vote is the 
sign of an adhesion to the State which renews it as such, regardless of the competing 
parties. The consequence of this is that, regardless of the “political philosophies” that 
the competing parties—the organizers that have an opinion regarding the State—
espouse, there is never but one unique politics. The diverse array of political coalitions 
that are found in France continues to attest to this.  
  
The Functional State 
 
The State can be called functional when it no longer pretends to be representative 
of the social body, and identifies itself by demonstrating statist technical expertise and 
its coercions (decisions are always presented as correct technical decisions). The 
functional has no relation except to the State as such. “Functional” means, 
consequently, that the State is no longer in antagonism and that it is no longer within 
the programatic: the end of the programmatic, which dates from the first years of 
Mitterrand, is the end of the idea that, through a set of promised or proposed actions, 
one can orient the State and its choices through its politics, which it gives to itself as 
possibles. “Functional” indicates that the State’s field of possibles is very limited and 
that, little by little, the forms of prescriptions on the State disappear. To the functional 
corresponds a “consensual,” which presents the inaccessible and separated State in its 
authoritarian and repressive aspect, and which has as its goal outlining the restricted 
and constrained space left to the field of consciousness.   
 
Technical expertise, as essence of the functional and consensual State, is essentially 
of an economic valence. The functional State is by no means the State of capital, 
capital which finds itself dealt with separately—this is the same meaning that one can 
give to the word “economy”—but rather it is the State that interiorizes its demands, 
and those of the crisis, by making them into objects of faith. When all is said and done, 
the consensual consists in leaving to the economy a part of the domain of politics that 
falls under the domain of the State and the government, and reducing the subjective 
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space not to the economy—and this is the paradox—but to statist values, arguing for 
the external nature of the economy, even though a significant part of the decisions 
bearing on the economy fall under the jurisdiction of statist politics. The consensual 
void empties out the prescriptive dimension of statist actions, while proposing to 
concentrate opinion not on the State’s real politics, but on its functional aspect, 
presented principally under the form of moral values. 
As it functions, the State must have at its disposal a majority of the professional 
political personnel descended from the parties. The vote is destined to produce such a 
majority, and the voting system ensures it. We claim that, in the unity of a function, 
the vote transforms (without exhibiting this transformation) the pluralist subjectivations 
of opinions about the government. In truth, such a transformation excludes all 
representation. As it demands consensus at the same time that it produces it, the State 
does not have to have any program, because every program assumes that it is the 
expression of a particular group (for a very long time, of a class). The vote transforms 
the vague programs or promises of the parties (transitory organizers of opinions about 
the State) by the authority of a consensus.   
The parliamentary State is regulated from outside by capital. It is not the State of 
capital (in the sense of a representation of class), but it supports regulation. The 
autonomy of the economy is that based on which the State’s norms are forged, and 
also based on which it attempts to subject opinions to the unity of the functional and the 
totality of the consensual. One can also say that the economy is that based on which 
the government establishes a sphere of necessity. It is always from the economy that 
what one is “obliged” to do, and above all, to endure, announces itself. That that the 
entirety of the parliamentary State's propagandist work is to convert these necessities 
into subjectivation, this is what concentrates the exteriority of regulation by capital. 
 
Finally, parliamentarianism takes a stance on the places that have been identified 
by other modes of politics, or by itself. 
Regarding the factory, it proclaims that it is the place of the current moment (for 
the PCF, it was the place of the class collective; for us, it is a political place). The 
place’s identity is prescribed by the period of the work day, itself assigned to the 
production of merchandises. It is what maintains the preference given to the word 
“enterprise” over the word “factory.” Mitterrandism has as its principal function 
eliminating the statement (proper to the PCF): the factory is the place of the collective of 
classes, and combatting the statement (of l’Organisation politique): in the factory, there is the 
worker. For parliamentarianism, there is no one in the factory (no one who is politically 
significant). There is only production. Beginning with Mitterandism, the 
parliamentarist conviction thrives on the eradication of the faces of the working.  
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As for the country, parliamentarianism declares that it is defined by “the French.” 
This identification of the country by the juridical notion of nationality has for its real a 
permanent network of surveillance and persecution of the “non-French”—and as the 
urban youths say—of the “Français de papier” (“the French on paper only,” i.e., those 
who have recently acquired citizenship or whose parents are of foreign origin). The 
central statement of parliamentarianism in this situation is: there is an immigration problem.  
Regarding the national question, parliamentarianism continues to take into 
account its total caving in before the Nazis. The recurring Pétainism (including the 
vomit that is the entire succession of presidents standing on that felon’s grave) aims to 
forbid all open discussion about the extreme instability of parliamentarist 
consciousness regarding what concerns the country; and more generally, to forbid 
anything that sheds light on the fact that, in France, references to the nation-State (and 
to its byproduct, “the French”) have been repeatedly used to cover up (1940 and 1958, 
the Algerian War) the collapse of the parliamentary State in ignominious conditions.  
Against all of this, we declare that the country is the entirety of those that live 
there, that there is not an “immigration problem,” that we cannot politically identify 
this country without its factories and without the faces of its workers, and that the 
reality of Pétainism has been a subjective collapse of the parliamentary State—in its 
old meaning of representative multipartyism—that hands the country over to the Nazi 
army. 
All attempts to outline a politics in interiority, or a politics as thought, demand a 
radical rupture with parliamentarianism. Such a rupture cannot be a simple fact of 
opinion (mumbling, moaning, declaring that everything is going wrong, going on 
about politicians, refraining from humor, gossiping about the “crisis of civil rights,” 
being ecologically minded, desiring to rebuild the left, to reform the PCF, by appealing 
to the Republic, and other nonsense). A materialist rupture demands that we create, 
against parliamentarianism, a non-parliamentary politics. The name of this creation is: 
Organisation politique.  
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